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PAIN AND SUFFERING: DAMAGES IN

SEARCH OF A SOUNDER RATIONALE
W. Kip Viscusi*
INTRODUCTION

Compensation for non-pecuniary losses is one of the most controversial components of tort liability. Newspaper headlines routinely feature
occasionally extreme awards, such as the $2.9 million award to the
women who spilled a hot cup of McDonald's coffee on her lap.1 In
contrast, small awards or accident victims who are unsuccessful in their
suits receive negligible press coverage.
Notwithstanding the salience of outlier award anecdotes, it is also
clear that people suffer from accidents in more than financial ways. Lost
earnings and medical costs often are not even the most consequential
implications of an injury. The loss of one's life, the welfare effects of
permanent disability, and the grief experienced by family members as
the result of the death of an accident victim are among the many other
consequences that distinguish personal injuries from events that simply
involve monetary transfers. There are also consequences of accidents
other than these itemized damages components, such as legal fees and
the personal investment in the litigation process. These expenses make
tort liability suits less of a windfall proposition than is frequently assumed.
While it is clear that there are effects of accidents that are not
monetary in nature, exactly what the court should do about these losses

remains a matter of substantial controversy. There are a variety of
approaches one could take to pain and suffering damages. The reason for
this diversity of viewpoints is that the manner in which one should
quantify the pain and suffering damages depends in large part on the
rationale for these damages. One possibility is to establish damages that
would provide appropriate incentives for the injurer to avoid injuring the
plaintiff in such accident contexts. A possibly related objective is to make
the plaintiff whole and restore the plaintiff to the same level of welfare
as would be experienced if there had been no injury. Alternatively, is the
* Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA and, prior to
June 30, 1996, George G. Allen Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Duke
University, Durham, NC. Paper prepared for The Michigan Law & Policy Review. Mark
Grady, Gary Schwartz, Louis Kaplow, and John Hanson provided helpful comments.
1. The original court award was $2.9 million but this was subsequently reduced on
appeal to $640,000.
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objective of these damages to provide the victim with the same level of
insurance that the victim would have chosen had pain and suffering
insurance been available? Whereas these three approaches may lead to
identical compensation levels for monetary losses, they usually will have
quite different implications for pain and suffering for personal injuries.
This article will be concerned with these and other possible rationales for
pain and suffering damages and their differing implications for how
damages awards should be set.
As the American Law Institute has observed, pain and suffering
damages reflect concerns with a variety of types of non-monetary loss:
Pain and suffering is a term that actually covers a number of
categories of non-pecuniary loss, the most important of which are
the following:
(1) Tangible physiological pain suffered by the victim at the
time of injury and during recuperation, a period that may be lengthy
but that is more often brief.
(2) The anguish and terror felt in the face of impending injury
or death, both before and after an accident. Claims for this kind of
harm have now become staple fare in suits arising from airplane
crashes.
(3) The immediate emotional distress and long-term loss of love
and companionship resulting from the injury or death of a close
family member.
(4) Most important, the enduring loss of enjoyment of life by

the accident victim who is denied the pleasures of normal personal
and social activities because of his permanent physical impairment,
a loss of which may not be perceived by individuals who suffer
brain damage.'
This paper will address pain and suffering generally and will not distinguish these different potential components of pain and suffering damages.
Section 1 presents the theoretical foundations for damages awards,
including both the deterrence and compensation objectives. Section 2
explores some practical rationales for pain and suffering damages, such
as the omission of legal fees as a component of damages. Section 3
examines the extent to which pain and suffering awards vary systematically with the extent and nature of the injury as opposed to simply being
random acts of capricious juries. Since much of the interest in pain and
suffering damages is intertwined with concerns about tort liability reform,
2. See 2 AMERIcAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTER'S STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR PERSONAL INJURY, at 199-200 (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1991) (this also
provides accompanying footnotes for many of these concepts).
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a major concern of interest is the extent to which these reforms are
influential in affecting liability losses. This is the subject of Section 4,
which examines the efficacy of tort liability reforms in achieving their
intended objectives. Section 5 examines several reform proposals and
indicates how different rationales for pain and suffering damages would

affect the level of pain and suffering awards and the objectives they
promote. The guiding principle that I will adopt is to assess which
structure of pain and suffering damages has the intended economic
consequences and best improves the overall performance of tort liability.
The objective is not cost minimization or reducing jury awards but
efficient operation of legal institutions.
1. Theoretical Principles for Pain and Suffering Compensation
There are a variety of different approaches that one can use to
rationalize pain and suffering compensation. The magnitude of the
compensation that is appropriate will depend substantially on which
rationale is pertinent and the nature of the injury. This outcome is
substantially different than what is the case for pecuniary losses, for
which the appropriate level of compensation is relatively robust with
respect to different conceptional rationales.
The Theory of Optimal Deterrence
In most tort liability contexts, the pivotal concerns are deterrence of
accidents afid appropriate compensation of accident victims. The meaning
of deterrence that will be taken here is the appropriate level of damage
payment that is needed to provide appropriate incentives for the injurer
to adopt an efficient level of care. These deterrence values are in no sense
punitive in that they will not punish the injurer for reckless behavior or
provide sufficient financial incentives to deter such behavior beyond the
individual case. Thus, the only sense in which the value is a deterrence

value is that if the injurer had faced these incentives in this particular
instance the injurer would have adopted the efficient level of care. In the
case of monetary losses, for example, paying for the monetary damages
inflicted in a specific case will establish appropriate levels of deterrence
with respect to the particular incident, but it will not influence the
injurer's behavior more broadly unless similar values are applied in all
other cases as well.
The determination of appropriate values of compensation needed to
establish efficient deterrence has a well established literature in econom-
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ics.3 In the case of mortality effects, this literature pertains to the implicit
value of life. More specifically, the approach inquires how much are
people willing to spend to prevent small risks to themselves. In the case
of labor market evidence, for example, workers generally require a
premium that averages $300 to $700 or a midpoint value of $500 to face
a mortality risk of 1/10,000 annually. Suppose that there are 10,000
similarly situated workers who face one expected death among their
group. These workers will receive total compensation value of $5 million
if the wage premium per worker is $500, or $5 million for one statistical
death.
There is a substantial literature on how these valuations can be
obtained. In the case of the value of life after an accidental death, there
have been dozens of studies documenting the implicit value associated
with on-the-job fatalities. These studies, which are reviewed in Viscusi
(1992, 1993), indicate a value of life that clusters in the $3 million to $7
million range, with a midpoint in the vicinity of $5 million. Similarly, job
injuries that are less severe in nature but typically lead to roughly one
month of lost work have an implicit value that clusters in the $25,000 to
$50,000 range.
To value outcomes for which there is not good data on either implicit
or explicit market trades, one can utilize survey evidence on the valuations associated with health risks. In the case of nontrivial injuries, the
appropriate approach to establish deterrence values is the individual's
willingness to pay to reduce a small risk of this health outcome. For
minor variations in well-being, the willingness to pay per unit risk will
equal the willingness to accept an increase in the value of the risk.
The preference for using a willingness to pay survey value over a
willingness to accept value is that this number is less likely to be biased
upward by individuals' predilection to place a substantial value on their
current risk position. 4 To obtain the implicit value of the health outcome
one then divides the willingness to pay amount by the risk reduction to
get a willingness to pay per unit risk, as in the case of the value-of-life
estimates. These values are summarized in Table 1 for a variety of
different nonfatal health risks, ranging from temporary eye bums to

3. For a review of these principles, see W. KIP Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991); W. Kip Vlscusl, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK (New York: Oxford University Press,
1992)[hereinafter VlScUSl, FATAL TRADEOFFS]; W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life andHealth,
29 . ECON. LIT. 1912 (December 1993).
4. See W.Kip Viscusi, Wesley A. Magat, and Joel Huber, Informational Regulation of
ConsumerHealthRisks: An EmpiricalEvaluationof Hazard Warnings, 17 RAND J. ECON. 351
(1986).
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chronic bronchitis and nonfatal lymphoma. In some cases, these responses
reflect an accurate understanding of the risk whereas for others, particularly the findings for gassings in Viscusi and Magat (1987), these high
willingness to pay values reflect an overreaction to the very small

probabilities presented to the respondents, as people experience difficulties perceiving small risks and giving valid responses to low probability
events. Consequently, the findings in Viscusi, Magat, and Huber (1987),
which were based on larger risks that were several orders of magnitude
greater, are likely to be more credible than the findings in Viscusi and
Magat (1987).
Using market evidence on the implicit value of life and injuries does
not necessarily assume that all market operations are perfect, including
those for risky products, in which case there would be no rationale for
any government intervention either through regulation or tort liability.5
The labor market evidence is for acute accident rates rather than dimly
understood health risks that are less likely to be assessed by workers.
Evidence on worker risk perceptions suggests that subjective risk beliefs
are strongly correlated with objective measures of the industry risk level.6
In addition, evidence from a high risk industry, notably the chemical
industry, suggests that an average worker's subjective risk perceptions of
the industry frequency rate are identical to the observed accident rate if
we exclude illnesses with long term consequences from consideration.7
Diverse sets of evidence from readily monitorable hazards as well as
hazards for which workers are given actual risk information suggest that
the compensating differentials and the implied values of the health
outcomes are in the ranges cited above.
There is some heterogeneity in these values because implicit values
of life and health are not natural constants. Individuals' attitudes toward

health risks and good health will affect the willingness to pay for improved safety and the implied values associated with these decisions. One
would not expect the implicit values of life and health to be identical for

5. Steven P. Croley and John D. Hanson, The Non-Pecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain and
Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1785, 1805 (1995), express a concern with
whether these risk beliefs are accurate, but the available evidence for job risks suggests that
worker risk perceptions for the types of hazards captured by risk premiums are reasonable.
6. See W. KIP ViscuSI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE
WORKPLACE (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1983); and VIscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS,
supra note 3, for reviews of this evidence. Moreover, see W. Kip Viscusi and William Evans,
Utility Functions that Depend on Health Status: Estimates and Economic Implications, 80 AM.
ECON. REv. 353 (1990)[hereinafter Viscusi and Evans, Utility Functions]; and W. Kip Viscusi,
EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS: AN INVESTIGATION OF MARKET PERFORMANCE (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press 1979), (shows premiums for objective and subjective risk perception variables
are comparable).
7. See Viscusi and Evans, Utility Functions, supra note 6.
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all people any more than one would require everyone to have the same
preferences with respect to different foods or forms of entertainment. For
example, smokers place a lower value on risk and those who wear
seatbelts place a higher value on risk."
Moreover, even if markets for risky jobs are in some sense imperfect,
the existence of an imperfection does not necessarily imply that the
statistical estimations have no informational content. If, for example,
workers assess the true risk of the job with some random error around the
actual risk, then the estimates of the implicit value of life and health will
be biased downward.9 This phenomenon represents the standard influence
of random measurement error on econometric estimates. In this instance,
the labor market evidence will provide a floor on the appropriate pain and
suffering deterrence values. Similarly, if one hypothesizes that risks are
systematically overestimated or systematically underestimated, one can
also make clearcut inferences with respect to the direction of the bias.
.It should also be emphasized that use of market-based evidence to
value pain and suffering within the context of tort liability, for which
there is substantial intervention with respect to product risks, does not
necessarily imply acceptance of the view that all job markets are perfect
and all product markets are intrinsically flawed. For many risks, such as
the differing hazards of automobiles of different size and weight, there is
likely to be accurate consumer perception of the nature of the hazards.
There is, for example, substantial evidence that safer cars command a
higher price that is reflective of a reasonable implicit value of life.' °
Similarly, few consumers would believe that skin contact with household
chemicals or ingestion of household chemicals is as safe as similar
contact with baking products. Consumers make a variety of judgements
with respect to the risks of products and, in this regard, also are assisted
by hazard warnings provided by the producers and by other sources of
information in the media and elsewhere with respect to product risks.
Although there are clearly some instances in which consumers are not
cognizant of the hazards posed'by a product, this situation is certainly not
the norm. Millions of product-related accidents occur every year, but not

8. See Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Smoking, Seatbelt Use, and Differences
in Wage-Risk Tradeoffs, 25 . HUM. RESOURCES 202 (1990) (for analysis of the variation in job
risk premiums by smoking status and seatbelt use).
9. This is the usual errors-in-variables problem.
10. For documentation of the implicit value of life reflected in automobile car prices, see
Mark Dreyfus and W. Kip Viscusi, Rates of Time Preference and Consumer Valuations of
Automobile Safety and Fuel Efficiency, 38 J. L. & ECON. 79 (1995) (finding that used car
purchases reflect an implicit value of life of about $3 million).
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all of these lead to litigation because they are among the well known
risks generally associated with life in an intrinsically risky world.
The Theory of Optimal Insurance
Another possible justification for pain and suffering compensation is
to make the victim whole in a sense of restoring the victim's pre-accident
level of utility. Compensation for pecuniary losses does this by replacing
the income that is lost. In the case of pain and suffering, one could
similarly transfer money in an effort to restore, in so far as is possible,
the level of utility that was experienced before the accident. In the case
of severe accidents, such as death and permanent impairment, it may be
that no monetary transfer will restore this pre-accident level of welfare.
Even more fundamental is that restoration of welfare levels is not in and
of itself a rationale for pain and suffering. Rather, it reflects one possible
outcome of a sound conceptual basis for pain and suffering compensation
that will be pertinent under very restrictive circumstances. As will be
shown below, in the normal situation there will be no fundamental
economic motivation for fully restoring the individual's welfare level.
Insurance only becomes a salient issue if individuals cannot purchase
adequate insurance on their own. If accident costs are covered by private
insurance, then the principal role of tort liability is that of deterrence.
Indeed, since many costs of tort liability will ultimately lead to higher
prices, duplicative product liability insurance would not be desirable. The
discussion below will assume that individuals are not fully insured against
all potential injury losses, particularly those associated with loss of
income for which there may be a moral hazard problem.
Insurance economists do not take as a given the assumption that
restoring welfare to the pre-accident level is appropriate. The more typical
perspective taken by economists is to engage in the thought experiment

of asking what insurance would the individual choose to provide in the
case of pain and suffering losses. Before engaging in this thought experiment, it is worth noting that in practice people now purchase billions of
dollars of insurance, little of which is devoted to pain and suffering
compensation. However, this insurance is not actuarially fair so that it is
useful to inquire what people would purchase if markets worked perfectly.
The insurance analogy is appropriate in that pain and suffering
expenses are an ongoing business expense associated with risky products.
Expenses that raise the marginal cost of production will lead to an
increase in the product price that will function in much the same way as
would an insurance premium. Consumers of the product consequently will

HeinOnline -- 1 Mich. L. & Pol'y Rev. 147 1996

Michigan Law & Policy Review

[Vol. I

purchase pain and suffering insurance as a bundled attribute of the
commodity. It should be emphasized that this thought experiment pertains

to a hypothetical world of perfect insurance in which the insurance sold
is actuarially fair (i.e., it breaks even and does not earn the insurance
company a profit) and the insurance company can monitor the actual pain
and suffering losses incurred as well as any contributory behavior on the
part of the injured party that led to the pain and suffering damages."
Once placed in this situation, it is useful to inquire what insurance the
individual would purchase. Figure 1 sketches the situation in which the
pain and suffering damage is simply tantamount to a monetary loss. The
person starts with an initial income Y0 and reaps the appropriate utility
level given by the utility function sketched in Figure 1. In this instance,
the pain and suffering loss is simply equivalent to some drop in monetary
income, so that experiencing pain and suffering is the same as if one's
income dropped from Yo to YI. The optimal insurance plan will then be
a premium that the individual will pay so that the utility and marginal
utility of income will be equalized whether or not the pain and suffering
loss occurs.' 2 In this case of financial losses, the result also equates total
utility level in the states with and without an accident. If insurance were
free the result would be a return to income level Yo. Since insurance is
costly, there is a drop in income to Y2 in both the pre-accident and postaccident states. In the post-accident state this is the income equivalent
taking into account pain and suffering losses. The gap between Yo and Y2
is the insurance premium. The prospective accident victim will in effect
experience this income level Y2 and the associated utility level irrespective of whether the accident occurs. Insurance in the case of monetary

equivalent losses consequently smooths out any welfare losses and
ensures that utility levels are unaffected. Since the accident does not
change the character of preferences, the marginal utility of income at Y2
is also the same irrespective of whether an accident occurs.
If, however, the accident has a more fundamental effect on the
victim's well-being and on the victim's ability to derive welfare from
expenditures, the optimal level of insurance may be quite different. Figure
2 sketches two different utility functions, Uo before the accident and U,
11. Loading fees and problems such as moral hazard will raise the effective price of
insurance to the insured, making it less desirable to purchase full insurance. These same factors
- administrative costs and adverse effects on victims' incentives - hinder compensation
through tort law as well.
12. This is a well established result in economics. See, e.g., KENNETH ARROW, ESSAYS
IN THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1971). The key
assumption is that people maximize expected utility - more precisely, the key assumption is
that people are rational maximizers,, because it has been demonstrated that basic elements of
rationality imply maximization of expected utility.
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after the accident. The individual begins with utility of U0 at the point
where the income level is Yo. After an accident, suppose the person has
become permanently disabled and is unable to engage in usual consump-

tion activities. The victim's income level has dropped from Y0 to Yl, and
the utility function governing the benefits derived from income is now
U1. The optimal level of insurance will be the amount that equates the
marginal utility of income after the accident with the marginal utility of
income before the accident. This amount will not equalize the utility
levels but instead will place the person at some income level Y2 after the
accident where the slope of U, at Y2 is the same as the slope of U0 at Yo
(if we ignore the insurance premium cost).,3 This income level is below
Y0 , which results in lower utility in-the post-accident situation than would
have been experienced before the accident either at income level Yo or at
Y, with utility function U0 . The reason is that the accident has lowered
the marginal utility of any given level of income and given this shift in
the value of money, it has become less desirable to transfer income to the
post-accident state.
Establishing equality in the utility levels would require that one
transfer enough income to the post-accident state to put one's income
level at Y3. However, such a large income transfer is very inefficient
given the flatness of U,. Moreover, in the case in which one actually
must make the insurance purchase, the effect will be to transfer resources
from the healthy state where the utility function is U0 to the post-accident
state so the consumer will be sacrificing income in a state where one
derives a high marginal utility of income to transfer the funds to a
situation in which the marginal utility of income is low.
Consider an example in which the chance of experiencing good health

and an injury is equal. Suppose that you fare a 50-50 chance of being
healthy or paralyzed, as happened to the actor Christopher Reeve. Also
assume that your medical and rehabilitation expenses are covered so the
only purpose of insurance is to allocate funds for consumption. Then
under situations of actuarially fair insurance, purchasers will face the
same price for providing resources either to the healthy state or the
injured state. Thus, for the same insurance premium, it is possible to
increase income for Uo by one dollar or increase income for U1 by one
dollar. Will you want as much money to spend on consumption after
being paralyzed as you would if healthy? Since the marginal utility of

13. As in the case of monetary losses, one could also incorporate into this analysis
payment for the insurance premium. The net result would be to lower the post-insurance
income amount a bit below Y, for the healthy state and a bit below Y2 for the post-accident
state.
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income is higher for Uo for any given level of income, it will be desirable
to transfer more income to one's self when healthy than when one's
ability to derive welfare from expenditures is impaired. This result does

not imply that no money is useful, only that you would want somewhat
less.
Consider another example that is certainly pertinent to the typical
reader. Suppose you are miserable and unable to enjoy spending money
during the week, but you are happy and capable of enjoying money on
the weekend. In this instance, you will reserve additional spending money
for the weekends when it will confer a substantial benefit to you rather
than spend it during the week when the money is less beneficial to your
welfare.
Croley and Hanson (1995) give a potential counterexample of a
person with an opera ticket who can give it to a healthy friend who is an
opera buff or a friend who enjoys opera less but has been "down on his
luck." They hypothesize that you might choose to give the ticket to the
disadvantaged friend even though the usual economic assessments might
suggest that the recipient's marginal utility of the ticket is less. However,
even though this person is down on his luck, they also suggest that the
recipient of the opera ticket would really appreciate it, which suggests
that in fact they seem to be implicitly assuming that there is a high
marginal utility conferred by the opera ticket. However, to contradict the
standard economic model of optimal insurance, the marginal utility
income must drop for the individual who is down on his luck, yet you
would still find it desirable to give the opera ticket to him.
This example also incorporates a charitable element that is not
pertinent. Am I giving the opera ticket to the disadvantaged friend in
order to experience the warm glow from an altruistic act? Giving to the

less fortunate, such as the homeless, for example, typically provides more
satisfaction to the donor than gifts targeted at the affluent. Am I giving
the ticket to the person "down on his luck" to benefit myself, or is this
gift a reflection of the ticket's high value to the recipient?
A more appropriate thought experiment that is more analogous to
liability awards is whether I would choose to buy insurance that would
not only prevent any income loss if I was temporarily less well off but
would also give me the extra bonus of the opera ticket. In the case of
injuries such as that to Christopher Reeve, it seems implausible that
consumption expenditures at a level beyond his pre-accident spending
would be desirable because he is unable to participate in most of his past
activities. Rather than insure for an opera ticket bonus, he surely would
prefer a drop in income for consumption purposes.

HeinOnline -- 1 Mich. L. & Pol'y Rev. 150 1996

19961

Damages in Search of a Sounder Rationale

In the absence of evidence on preferences after injuries, one might

construct scenarios with different implications. It is frequently suggested
that one rationale for pain and suffering damages is that various expenditures of money are needed after an injury to promote the individual's
welfare.'4 An elevator in the victim's house, a ramp for handicap access,

or a van equipped for a handicapped person are among the potential items
that could substantially promote welfare of the victim and be a legitimate
component of damages. The paralyzed actor, Christopher Reeve, has also
benefitted from numerous technical devices to assist in breathing and
other activities.
However, these items of damages are not properly viewed as pain and
suffering compensation but rather as medical rehabilitation expenses.
Capital expenses such as these as well as labor expenses, such as rehabilitation services, are explicit components of damages already included
within the usual medical and rehabilitation cost components. Their
inclusion is quite appropriatb from an economic standpoint since they
surely yield a high marginal utility. These are quantified economic
aspects of the loss as opposed to the nonpecuniary losses associated with
pain and suffering. Thus, this particular rationale for pain and suffering
damages does not in fact provide a distinctive justification for a new
damages component since it is already addressed by other aspects of the
damages award.
Thus, much of the difference between optimal insurance concepts for
pain and suffering and the views of strong advocates of pain and suffering insurance, such as Croley and Hanson, may stem in part from semantics and the nature of the designation of the award components. There are
many expenditures for the injured that are of a rehabilitative nature that
clearly confer substantial benefits and may dramatically improve the
quality of life of the injured party. I would follow the usual court practice
of designating these outcomes as rehabilitation expenses, not as pain and
suffering. I would then restrict pain and suffering compensation as

expenses that are justified not through targeted expenditures that are
specifically designed to address the consequences of the injury, but rather
to compensation that can be used for general consumption purposes. For
this character of compensation, which is the usual meaning of pain and
suffering compensation, optimal insurance principles will lead to providing less compensation after injuries that are sufficiently serious to diminish the welfare one can derive from spending money.

14. See Croley and Hanson, supra note 5 at 1799. These arguments are not unique to
them. See also, STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1987) (others also raise this issue).
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The distinction between rehabilitation expenditures and "make whole"
pain and suffering amounts is also clear in that these rehabilitation steps
stop short of making the person whole. The provision of wheelchairs does

not completely eliminate the welfare loss experienced by paraplegics. We
can try to diminish psychic losses through the provision of psychological
counseling, but if I am depressed after experiencing a disability even
substantial monetary transfers through the courts will not fully restore my
spirits. Ultimately, the designation of the components of compensation is
not relevant to the overriding issue which is at stake. Should the total
package of the award be designed to restore the level of utility after an
accident or simply to produce the same marginal utility as one would
have experience had the accident not occurred? The fundamental implication of the theory of optimal insurance is that the marginal utility level
should be our concern, not the overall level of welfare. The studies that
I will cite below are based on the responses of healthy workers and
consumers to different levels of risk. From these responses, it is possible
to estimate the underlying structure of utility functions, including how the
utility functions vary after an injury.
To resolve the issue of exactly how such accidents alter utility
functions, one must obtain empirical evidence. In a series of papers,
William Evans and I have estimated utility functions as a function of
individual health status, thus making it possible to make inferences with
respect to the effect of accidents on preferences. 5 For severe accidents,
such as the typical job accident that on ave'rage forces workers to miss
roughly a month of work, the effect of the accident is to lower the
marginal utility of money.' If such individuals were faced with the
opportunity to purchase actuarially fair insurance, they would not choose
to buy full insurance. Rather, their optimal replacement rate would be 85
percent of the financial losses they experience. This partial insurance is
desirable since job accidents impede their ability to derive well-being
from the usual kinds of consumption expenditures that would be possible
if not impaired by the accident.
Not all accidents will alter the structure of utility functions. Some
minor accidents, such as those associated with household chemical
products, are tantamount to a decrease in income so that marginal utility

15. See Viscusi and Evans, Utility Functions, supra note 6; and William Evans and W.
Kip Viscusi, Estimation of State-Dependent Utility Functions Using Survey Data, 123 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 94 (1991)[hereinafter Evans and Viscusi, Estimation of State Dependent Utility
Functions Using Survey Data].
16. In the case of logarithmic utility functions, Viscusi and Evans, Utility Functions,supra
note 6, show that the utility function in the injured state was In Y, and the utility function when
healthy is 1.077 In Y. Similar results were obtained using a flexible functional form.
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is enhanced after an injury. 7 In these accidents, which are equivalent to
monetary losses, people would presumably want to purchase insurance to

fully compensate for the losses."8
The level of such insurance would not, however, be great, as it would
equal the monetary loss equivalent of the accident. The optimal
actuarially fair insurance for accident victims and families without young
children - given the estimated U functions - is $482 for toilet bowl
cleaner gassings, $504 for toilet bowl cleaner eye bums, $605 for insecticide skin poisonings, and $842 for insecticide inhalation. What these
results suggest is that accidents that are of minor consequence may not
have such fundamental effects on one's welfare that one can distinguish
any effect on the shape of the utility functions. Even in the case of
accidents that may affect young children, such as insecticide child
poisonings, for which the optimal fair insurance amount is $2,482 given
the estimated utility functions, there is no evidence of a change in the
structure of utility functions as a result of the accident. 9 Such a result is
entirely plausible. Temporary injuries should have little or no effect on
how additional income affects one's well-being after the injury has been
experienced.
One possible objective of pain and suffering damages is to equalize
the utility that an individual will experience irrespective of an accident.2'
Under this scenario, the economic damages award would eliminate any
financial loss, and the pain and suffering award would restore the individual to the same level of welfare as would have been experienced if the
accident had not occurred. Such an approach clearly would be an inefficient insurance approach in the case of fatalities even if substantial pain
and suffering had been experienced.
Presumably no amount of compensation after the fact will restore the
accident victim to the same level of welfare had the fatality not occurred.

Would, for example, individuals be willing to forfeit all their income in
the healthy states so as to increase their income sufficiently in the postdisability state to eliminate the effect of the disability? Preferences of this
type are implicit in a "make whole" assumption for fatality insurance.

17. See Evans and Viscusi, Estimation of State Dependent Utility Functions Using Survey
Data, supra note 15.
18. These accidents would, for example, fit the mold of those discussed by Croley and
Hanson, supra note 5.
19. These estimates for optimal fair insurance are drawn from W. Kip Viscusi, Social
Insurancefor Work and Product Injuries, 15 THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE
THEORY 115, 128 (1990).
20. See Croley and Hanson, supra note 5 at 1817-1821. (The authors consider this
rationale in detail and generally find many attractive features in the approach. However, they
ultimately fall short of endorsing it).
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Such extensive insurance would be unattractive to potential injured parties
if they had to pay for such coverage. Similarly, in the case of catastrophic
accidents such as those that produce brain damage, quadriplegia, or
similar massive assaults on one's physical well-being, it is possible that
no financial transfer could make one just as well off had the accident not
occurred. Moreover, whatever financial transfer would be required to
achieve this equality would presumably be many times larger than the
current levels of pain and suffering damages.
One possible approach for justifying full insurance is to appeal to a
Rawlsian approach.2 Perhaps individuals would choose to set up a pain
and suffering compensation regime that equalized utility irrespective of
an accident, based on their assessment of what would happen behind a
Rawlsian "veil of ignorance." This Rawlsian construct is frequently used
to assess social decisions. If one applied this approach to thinking about
how prospective accident victims might set up a compensation scheme,
one might ask how people would structure insurance if they did not know
their future medical condition following an accident. Would they choose
to equalize utility across states of nature or, in a strict Rawlsian sense,
maximize the utility in the state in which one's welfare was lowest?
What is missing from this approach is appropriate recognition of the
probabilities that the different pain and suffering events would occur and
the implications these probabilities and payoffs have for the costs of
purchasing insurance. The thought experiment of asking people how they
would structure pain and suffering compensation if they could purchase

such insurance on an actuarially fair basis is identical to what one might
hope to achieve through the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. The only difference is that there might be some person-specific characteristics influencing the insurance decision, such as the choice of consumption patterns.
However, even if we purge the optimal insurance problem of these
person-specific aspects, the fundamental economic result that expected
utility maximizers will purchase actuarially fair insurance to equalize the
marginal utility in different health states remains true.' This is not mere
intuition. It is a well established theorem of how individuals would
behave if they are rational.23 To the extent that the accident impedes
one's ability to derive welfare from additional expenditures, thus lowering
the marginal utility for any given income level, it will be desirable to

21. Croley and Hanson, supra note 5, explore this potential rationale in detail.
22. One only obtains the Rawlsian result that one maximizes utility in the worst off state
if one imposes this result by assumption rather than assessing the implications of rationality.
23. Croley and Hanson, supra note 5, and other commentators also assume rationality.
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transfer less income to the post-accident state .once the physical or mental
impairment has occurred.
It is also possible to appeal to the actual structure of observed
insurance policies, which appear to be consistent with these empirical
findings regarding the shape of individual preferences. For example,
people do not generally purchase pain and suffering insurance for their
accidents. The fact that we do not observe such insurance purchases in
the market is consistent with the stronger empirical evidence with respect
to the structure of utility functions. However, it is not fully conclusive
because of the possible insurance market imperfections. Insurers may, for
example, not be able to readily monitor the severity of the pain and
suffering loss. It should be noted, however, that even market imperfections do not prevent the provision of some minimal pain and suffering
amounts even though full compensation of all losses may involve problems in monitoring the extent of the loss.
Croley and Hanson (1995) suggest that juries may in fact act in the
same manner as would people purchasing insurance since they will realize
that pain and suffering awards ultimately will affect the product prices for
their prior purchases. If that were the case, juries presumably would not
award unreasonable pain and suffering damages unless such insurance
were attractive to them on a prospective basis. This conclusion assumes

that juries understand that such a price mechanism will exist and also can
determine the implications of one jury award for the national market of
this product. Moreover, in the case of pain and suffering damages for
previously manufactured product models or products that can be redesigned to avoid such pain and suffering damages in the future, the pain
and suffering damage award will largely serve as a lump sum cost rather
than as a marginal cost that will affect prospective consumer purchases.
Juries need not exercise any restraint in this instance. The assumption that
juries will be cognizant of these costs assumes that juries can anticipate
how these litigation costs will be reflected in a myriad of other court
decisions for the product. It is more likely that whatever judgement they
make will be narrowly confined to that particular case so that the role of
jury responsibility may be minor.
Compensation for pain and suffering damages also would be infeasible if it violated some accepted societal norm. 2' However, it is unclear
why such compensation would be viewed as inappropriate through an
insurance mechanism, whereas it is entirely appropriate as a routine
element of damages in the courts. Moreover, there seems to be no societal
24. See the discussion by Croley and Hanson, supra note 5; and Cass Sunstein,
Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 788 (1994).
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reluctance to provide insurance either for medical costs or income losses
in the event of death or injury for any family member, and it would seem
that suggesting that a dead spouse could be monetized and treated as
equivalent to simply a loss in earnings would be more offensive to moral
sensitivities than would suggesting~that the spouse's value to the family
went beyond earnings alone.
In instances such as these, how the pain and suffering issue is framed
may be quite important. In the environmental context, for example,
tradeable pollution permits have an unfavorable connotation, whereas the
ability of firms to purchase pollution reduction credits appears less
objectionable and was the ultimate designation selected by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency.
There is also an important temporal aspect to pain and suffering
damages for those accidents that do not have long-term effects on the
individual's welfare. Once the trial date has arrived, the temporary pain
and suffering loss from, for example, an instance of food poisoning may
have long since passed. At the time of the food poisoning incident when
the individual spent a weekend being ill, the pain and suffering award
was not available to provide for movie rentals or other amenities that
might have enhanced the individual's welfare when the pain and suffering
was experienced. Indeed, it may be that additional consumption expendi-

tures would not have been made by the poisoning victim even if the pain
and suffering award had been provided when the victim was bedridden
as a result of the poisoning. When you have food poisoning and are ill
for a week, do you live it up in order to compensate for the welfare loss
you have suffered or do you skip the planned evening out, saving the
money until you are well?
What pain and suffering awards accomplish is to confer additional
benefits to that person after the injury, resulting in a higher level of
welfare than would have been experienced had the injury not occurred.
To the extent that the injury is tantamount to a monetary equivalent, as
minor poisonings tend to be, the total level of welfare that is experienced
over the accident period and the post-accident trial period will be roughly
the same had the poisoning not occurred, but the temporal pattern will be
different and more uneven. Thus, pain and suffering awards may return
the total level of welfare over the pre- and post-accident period to what
it would have been had the accident not occurred.
The Tradeoff Between Optimal Incentives and Optimal Deterrence
Unfortunately, it is not possible to structure the optimal pain and
suffering amounts to simultaneously promote the objectives of optimal
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insurance and optimal deterrence. If we provide pain and suffering
compensation equivalent to the optimal deterrence amounts, then this
coverage will provide excessive insurance. Similarly, if courts only
provide plaintiffs with pain and suffering amounts that are optimal from
an insurance context, then the court awards will not generate adequate
incentives for deterrence. The task for any award is to strike a balance
between these competing objectives. To the extent that deterrence objectives are more salient, the higher deterrence values are more pertinent,
whereas if insurance is the dominant goal then the rationale for pain and
suffering awards becomes substantially weakened.
It should be noted with respect to the insurance objective, however,
that tort liability is not the only source of insurance. Some victims can
and often do have first party insurance to cover the losses they have
experienced. To the extent that these insurance needs have been met
through their own purchases, the main concern should not be with
insurance but rather with the deterrence role of tort liability.
One possibility is to impose a tort fine that would penalize injurers
for the pain and suffering damages but would not transfer resources to the
injured party.' Thus, this segment of the award would go to the state and
would not provide excessive insurance. The difficulty with any such
proposal is that at the settlement stage the plaintiff could capture some of
the expected cost to the injurer associated with the tort fine since it would
be in the injurer's financial self interest to bargain for only the economic
loss component as well as any residual amount that was necessary to
provide an economic inducement for the plaintiff26to avoid seeking a court
verdict that would trigger payment to the state.
2. Pain and Suffering Awards as Offsets to Undercompensation
Under Ordinary Damages
Theoretical discussions of damages awards generally assume that the
legal world is without transactions costs. The reality is quite different. In
particular, to obtain their awards for economic loss and pain and suffering
damages, plaintiffs may have to expend substantial resources, often on the
order of one-third of the total value of the award. These funds are used
to cover legal fees, the costs of experts, and related expenses, where these

25. For fuller discussion of this approach, see A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon Soo Che,
Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J. ECON. 562

(1991).
26. Steven Shavell (oral communication with the author) suggests that one possibility is
that out-of-court settlements will not be enforceable by the courts unless the settlement is

reported, thus facilitating the monitoring of settlements and assessment of fines.
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expenses are often assumed by plaintiff lawyers on a contingency fee
basis. The net result is that the amount of money transferred to the
plaintiff as a result of an award will typically be substantially less than
the value of the economic loss if there is no additional compensation for
non-economic damages.
The practical role of pain and suffering compensation in facilitating
the payment of legal fees has not been lost on legal reformers. The
American Law Institute tort liability reform group, for example, commented favorably on various limitations and schedules for pain and
suffering awards.2 7 However, the American Law Institute group coupled
this reform proposal with an accompanying recommendation that there be
a provision made to cover a plaintiff's legal fees. Critics of such a
proposal may view it as being largely political in nature. To obtain the
support of the plaintiff's bar for tort liability reform some provision for

legal fees might be viewed as a necessary component to buy off their
financial stake. However, such a measure that addresses the importance
of legal fees is quite sensible from an economic standpoint and from the
reality of financing litigation. Unless there is an accounting for the
deductions that will be made from a personal injury award that addresses
only economic loss, plaintiffs will not fully recover the economic losses
they have suffered once legal costs are deducted.' The net effect will be
that the tort liability award will not even meet their income compensation
needs, much less any additional payments that may be warranted by
addressing non-economic damage concerns.
From an efficiency standpoint, it is desirable for the defendant to pay
these costs in the simple model in which the injurer is solely responsible
for the injury. What are the social costs of the accident? The plaintiff will
not only suffer lost earnings, medical costs, and pain and suffering, but,
will also incur legal expenses. Failure to compensate for these expenses
will provide for inadequate incentives for deterrence and will also
undercompensate accident victims for the losses they have experienced.
The second potential practical rationale for pain and suffering awards
is that the economic damages compensation may not be complete. As was
discussed in Section 2, many consumer expenditures that are specifically
targeted toward the needs of those who have suffered impairments of
various kinds may generate a very high marginal utility. Handicapaccessible vans and related kinds of capital expenditures that make the
lives of the handicapped more fulfilling than they would otherwise be

27. See A.L.I., supra note 2 at 264-265.
28. See Louis Kaplow, Shifting Plaintiffs' Fees versus Increasing Damage Awards, 24
RAND J. ECON. 625 (1993).
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may generate an extremely high marginal utility. If that is the case, then
these expenses should be encompassed within the provision for medical
expenses and rehabilitation expenses. To the extent that they are not
addressed, there would be a rationale for an additional pain and suffering
award. However, the purpose of this award is in effect not to compensate
the victim or provide deterrence to the injurer for any pain and suffering
damage. Rather, it is a recognition that the legitimate economic insurance
needs of the individual have not been met by the standard provisions for
economic damages. In order to encourage courts to distinguish these
issues in a clearcut manner, there should be separation of the rationale for
compensation for pain and suffering. In practice, there may be some
inevitable overlap if for some reason there is a limitation on the provision

of rehabilitation expenditures.
3. Patterns of Pain and Suffering Awards
To obtain an assessment of the total value of pain and suffering
awards and their relationship to various injury classes, let us consider data
based on the Insurance Services Office Product Liability Closed Claims
Survey. This survey pertains to a sample of claims closed by companies
from mid-1976 to mid-1977. Unfortunately, there is no more recent data
set that provides a comprehensive perspective on the magnitude of pain
and suffering award compensation and the relationship of this compensation to the character of the injury. Although these data are before the
most recent tort liability crisis and the wave of reform efforts following
it, they nevertheless are instructive in indicating how pain and suffering
awards are treated in the courts and how these awards in turn will
influence out-of-court settlements.
For concreteness, the value of pain and suffering is defined as the
total value of the award or out-of-court settlement less the value of
economic damages. Thus, this measure is in effect the value of noneconomic damage compensation (i.e., including punitive damages) rather
than simply pain and suffering. Table 2 presents evidence on the pain and
suffering awards for court verdicts. Because most cases in the sample
settled out of court, the sample size of cases that were resolved in court
is only 159 cases. For cases in which there was pain and suffering
compensation, the pain and suffering share of compensation overall
ranges from 13 percent for concussions to 95 percent for electric shock
victims. If we exclude all cases in which there was not pain and suffering
compensation at all and focus only on cases in which there was positive
compensation for pain suffering, then the role of pain and suffering is
characterized by the final two columns in Table 2. The overall fraction
of the payments for pain and suffering follows a similar pattern to that
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indicated above for all our court verdicts, where the largest dollar value
of pain and suffering compensation is for brain damage victims for which
just over half of the award is for pain and suffering.
A more complete perspective on the potential role of pain and
suffering damages is provided by the results in Table 3. This table
pertains to 7,957 claims that were settled out of court. To the extent that
pain and suffering awards are made in court as part of the court verdict,
there will be a backward influence of these awards on the size of the outof-court settlements that the parties are willing to make. In particular,
pain and suffering awards will raise the expected stakes of going to court
and, in the case of risk-neutral plaintiffs and defendants with identical
beliefs about the probability that the plaintiff will prevail in court, will
increase the maximum offer amount by the defendant and the minimum
acceptance amount by the plaintiff by the same degree. This more
extensive sample of pain and sufferingcompensation indicates that for all

cases, including those in which there is no pain and suffering compensation, the overall share of pain and suffering awards ranges from 26
percent for para/quadriplegia to a high value of 57 percent for bums. If
we restrict the attention to only those cases in which there is positive pain
and suffering compensation, the overall share of pain and suffering
compensation spans a narrow range from 50 percent for para/quadriplegia
to a high of 76 percent for respiratory injuries and illnesses. This high
value is an outlier, as virtually all pain and suffering awards in situations
in which there is pain and suffering compensation comprise from 60-70
percent of the total value of the payment.
This fairly uniform percentage may lead one to believe that the pain
and suffering award is simply a standard mark-up over economic loss.
Various hypotheses with respect to pain and suffering damages are the
subject of empirical tests presented for this data set in my earlier paper.2 9
My regression analysis for pain and suffering damages indicates that pain
and suffering awards increase with the size of the financial loss, but this
relationship is not on a one-for-one basis. In particular, the elasticity of
pain and suffering damages with respect to financial losses is 0.66 so that
a one percentage change in economic loss will lead to a 0.66 percent
change in the total value of pain and sufferings awards. One can consequently reject the hypotheses that pain and suffering awards are a flat
amount wholly invariant with the size of the economic loss.
Moreover, one can reject the hypothesis that pain and suffering
awards are simply a standard percentage markup of the financial loss. The

29. See W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic
Compensation or CapriciousAwards?, 8 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 203 (1988).
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character of the injury matters as well. Controlling for the economic loss,
there is a higher value of the pain and suffering award for amputations,
bums, cancer, lacerations, poisonings, and sprains/strains. Other ailments
such as fractures and para/quadriplegia receive a lower fraction of pain
and suffering award than other ailments, controlling for the economic
loss. In short, there are many systematic elements of pain and suffering
awards in the courts.
One can certainly reject the hypothesis that pain and suffering awards
are simply a fixed amount or fixed percentage of the economic loss. One
can also reject extreme hypotheses that pain and suffering awards are
entirely random. These awards vary quite systematically with the character of the injury and the amount of the economic loss. However, the
presence of such a systematic variation does not in and of itself imply
that these awards are entirely rational. They do not suggest that these

awards are too high, too low, or optimal. Instead, they simply indicate a
pattern of regularity that suggests that the most extreme critiques of pain
and sufferings awards are not well founded.
The final empirical issue with respect to this data set is the subject of
Table 4, which presents the effect of the pain and suffering cap on
different categories of damages. This table highlights the inequity of a
pain and suffering cap ranging from $50,000 to $150,000 in mid-1970s
dollars or caps of more than twice this amount in today's prices. As can
be seen, there is a substantial differential effect of the cap on different
classes of injuries. Very severe injuries, such as brain damage and
para/quadriplegia would be particularly hard hit by a pain and suffering
cap since at present these injuries receive a high absolute value of
compensation for pain and suffering damages. In contrast, relatively
minor injuries such as dermatitis, electrical shock, and poisonings would
tend to be relatively unaffected. What these results- suggest is that a
uniform dollar cap on pain and suffering damages would not in fact treat
all tort liability victims equitably since those who are particularly severely
impaired would suffer the brunt of the effects of a pain and suffering cap.
The overall task of tort liability reform is not to cap damages but
rather to place damages on a sounder footing. There is no a priorireason
to necessarily believe that pain and suffering awards in the most severe
injury cases are the most extreme. For this particular data set, as was
indicated above, the percentage value of pain suffering compensation
increases on less than a one for one basis with the value of the economic
loss. Moreover, for the same data set, it can be shown that in terms of the
total value of compensation relative to total value of economic loss it is
the large loss cases that tend to be most under-compensated and the small
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loss cases that tend to be most over-compensated?0° As a result, there
appears to be little empirical rationale for singling out the victims of the
most severe injuries for pain and suffering reforms since it would limit
the resources that are transferred to ameliorate the losses they have
experienced as the result of their injuries.
4. The Effect of Pain and Suffering Reforms
Over the past two decades, a variety of states have enacted various
types of caps and limits on pain and suffering damages. Although
conceptually these reforms should be of some consequence in limiting
damages, this need not be the case. Juries, for example, may adjust the
awards in other ways to provide more compensation to the victim in
terms of economic damages or other components of damages in order to
avoid the restrictions imposed by the pain and suffering limit. If, for
example, the pain and suffering designation simply served as a convenient
mechanism for juries to transfer resources to plaintiffs to cover legal expenses, then the existence of pain and suffering caps may have no effect
on the magnitude of the award if the juries react to the cap by altering the
level of compensation for other purposes so as to meet the perceived legal
costs of the plaintiff. In addition, pain and suffering caps and their
enactment are also accompanied by the presence of a variety of other
kinds of legal reforms, such as changes in statute of limitations provisions
and similar measures. It is consequently an interesting empirical question
to distinguish whether it has been pain and suffering damages caps per
se that have had any influence on the magnitudes of the awards or
whether the cause is simply the overall change in the legal climate that
has resulted from the enactment of a package of tort liability reform.
To explore these issues, I will rely on two sets of data, one pertaining
to product liability and a second pertaining to medical malpractice.
Consider first the product liability data, which in this case will pertain to
the product liability premium files by the company of purchase and by
year for the 1980-1984 period. This data set was developed by the
Insurance Services Office for ratemaking purposes, but it can nevertheless
by used in conjunction with information regarding the state of the
insurance company selling the insurance in order to assess the effect of
liability reforms.
Since the structure of the data set is that the observational unit is the
company purchasing the insurance policy, what will be pertinent for this

30. See W. Kip Viscusi,
University Press 1991).

REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY,

at 52 (Cambridge: Harvard
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assessment is the tort regime in the state in which the insured is located.
Since most very large companies tend to self-insure, the data set by its
very nature tends to pick up the smaller companies whose operations in
many cases will tend to be within state. Moreover, to the extent that there
is error, such random measurement error should bias downward the
effects of pain and suffering limits for this particular data set. A different
statistical structure will be employed to assess the effect of pain and
suffering limits for medical malpractice, thus making it possible to have
different statistical perspectives on the role of pain and suffering damages.
What we would like to observe is the effect of the enactment of
damages rules on the level of pain and suffering compensation or on total
awards. Thus, ideally we would like to have information on some
experiment that has occurred to enable us to assess the incremental effect

of imposing a damages rule on some tort liability context. Unfortunately,

that is not possible during this sample period, but it is possible to analyze
the differing performance of states in which damages rules, many of
which pertain to pain and suffering, were in place from states in which
damages rules were not in place.3 1 Overall, much of the difference in the
presence of damages rules seems to reflect the factors that led to the
adoptiorn of these rules rather than the influence of these rules in restraining awards. For example, in states with damages rules, the percentage
increase in product liability premiums from 1980-1984 was 69.3 percent,
wherea in states without these rules the percentage was only 53.2
percent. This somewhat paradoxical result would be consistent if the high
liability cost states were more likely to have adopted such rules initially,
which seems to be the case.
A similar kind of influence was also borne out in other measures of
the consequences of damages rules. The principal measure of insurance
profitability is the loss ratio, which is the ratio of losses associated with
a policy to the premiums. The loss ratio is inversely related to the
profitability of the insurance policy. For states with damages rules, this
loss ratio was virtually constant between 1980 and 1984, as its value was
0.86 in each of these years. In contrast, there was a decline in the loss
ratio from 0.89 to 0.83 for states in which there were no damages rules.
Thus, the profitability of insurance improved more in states without
damages rules than in states with damages rules. States with damages
rules also experienced a higher loss per claim - on average 15 percent

31. These results are discussed in Viscusi, supra note 29; Viscusi, supra note 30; and W.
Kip Viscusi, The Performanceof LiabilityInsurance in States with DifferentProducts-Liability
Statutes, 19 J. LEaAL STUD. 809 (1990).
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more. Not surprisingly, insurance companies also charged a somewhat
higher premium for states in which there were damages rules in place.
These results hold even within the context of a multivariate regression
analysis that takes into account the coverage of the insurance policy and
other liability reform measures that may be in place. Even within a
regression analysis the presence of a damage provision within a particular
state is positively linked to the value of the bodily insurance premium
level, controlling for other factors. 32
To better disentangle the role of the damages provisions, it is more
instructive to analyze the legal context in which there was a shift within
the state that led to the adoption of a damages cap and then explore the

effect of this change in the liability structure on the performance of tort
liability within the state. That was the focus of my study with Patricia
Born on medical malpractice insurance.33 An importance difference of this
study is that the time period and the unit of observation in the sample
were quite different. Rather than focusing on the pre-liability crisis
period, this study focused on the 1985-1991 period that captures the
effects of the recent liability crisis and the reforms that were subsequently
enacted. Instead of focusing on the purchasing insured company (i.e., the
producer of the insured product) as the unit of observation, the data set
used in this study pertains to insurance firms. The particular data set used
was developed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
These data include as a unit of observation every insurance firm, in every
state, in every year, that wrote insurance coverage for medical malpractice
over this time period. For example, if Prudential Insurance wrote coverage in 50 states in 1989, it would appear as 50 separate observational
units in that year. As a result, it is an exhaustive data set in terms of the
scope of its coverage and is considerably more comprehensive and at a
more refined level of detail than has been used in any other medical
malpractice study in the literature.
Consider the performance of medical malpractice reforms in the state
of Michigan, which adopted a $225,000 cap on noneconomic damages in
1986, and the performance of reform efforts in Wisconsin, which adopted
a medical malpractice damages cap of one million dollars. In each of
these states, there was a substantial effect resulting from the enactment
of the reforms, particularly for the firms at the least profitable end of the
profitability spectrum. Thus, reforms have a differential effect across the

32. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Performance of Liability Insurance in States with Different
Products-LiabilityStatutes, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 809, 832 (1990), for the regression results.

33. See W. Kip Viscusi and Patricia Born, Medical Malpractice Insurance in the Wake
of Liability Reform, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1995).
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distribution of the profitability, with the greatest effect being experience
by the large loss firms.
Figure 3 sketches trends in various measures of the insurance company loss ratio for the medical malpractice insurers of the state of
Michigan. The loss ratio (i.e., the ratio of losses to premiums) is the
principal measure of insurance profitability, as a loss ratio of 1.0 is the
break-even level (excluding the role of interest earned on premiums) and
loss ratios above 1.0 are unprofitable. The mean loss ratios dropped from

1.7 in 1984 and 1985 to 1.1 in the year of the reform, 1986, and stayed
below 1.0 thereafter. The median loss ratios exhibited similar improvement. The greatest change was for the most unprofitable firms - reflected in Figure 3 by the 75th percentile of the distribution of firms' loss

ratios. For this group, the loss ratios were as high as 4.0 in 1984, but they
dropped below 1.0 from 1988 on. Tort liability reforms such as damages
caps consequently have a differential effect across the market, benefitting
the least profitable firms the most.
To a large extent, this is the kind of result one might expect. Damages caps suppress the large loss outliers most likely to affect the least
profitable firms. However, from the standpoint of economic efficiency
one might well raise a potential concern that these reforms do not have
a similarly beneficial effect on the more profitable and better managed
enterprises. The distribution of the liability reform effects in the market
may also affect the extent to which the benefits of the reform are passed
through to consumers.
For the national insurance firm data set, the reforms enacted in the
1970s seem to have a relatively modest effect. The reform in this period
that appeared to be most consequential was the set of reforms dealing
with the ceiling on recoveries enacted in 1975 and 1976. However, the
magnitude of the effect of this reform is not as substantial as the damages
reforms enacted in the 1980s. The magnitude of the influence of the
reforms in the 1980s was almost twice as great as those enacted in the
1970s based on the effect on overall losses associated with insurance,
controlling for the value of premiums and a wide variety of other influences. 4 There is less of an effect of the reforms on the level of premiums.
What this pair of results suggests is that the overall effect of dam-

ages caps in this situation in which premiums were initially too low to
cover losses is to enhance the profitability of insurance by reducing losses
without lowering premiums to the same extent. In a competitive market,

34. These observations are based on the results in Table 8 of Id. at 486.
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one would expect the effects of the liability reforms ultimately to be
passed on to purchasers of insurance through lower prices. However,
since these prices were temporarily out of their equilibrium value and at
a rate that was above the level that was needed to maintain a normal rate
of profitability, then the effect of the liability reforms was to prevent
insurance companies from raising prices as much as they would have
needed to do had the reforms not reduced the size of the losses that
needed to be covered through higher premiums.

In terms of the specific magnitude of the effect, the influences
involved are quite large. The damages limitations enacted in the 1980s
account for a 16 percent-29 percent reduction in the total value of losses
in the short run, where the extent of the effect depends on whether one
also takes into account all state-specific differences. This latter correction
leads to the higher end estimates cited above. The ultimate long-run
effects of the liability reforms are likely to be even greater to the extent
that this analysis assessed the value of losses in the given years being
highly dependent on the losses in the previous year. Thus, to the extent
that liability reforms affect the loss history favorably, they will also tend
to have a beneficial statistical influence on the magnitude of the losses
observed in the future.35
What these results do suggest is that tort liability reforms can be a
very powerful mechanism for influencing the magnitude of damages
awards in the overall cost of the liability system. In this analysis of
medical malpractice insurance, the damages provisions were the most
influential in affecting insurance market outcomes. Other reforms, such
as collateral source rule changes, attorneys' fee provisions, and related
reforms did not have as consistent depressing influence on the magnitude
of losses and, to the extent that they were influential, did not have an
effect that was of the same magnitude as the damages limitations.
Overall, the damages caps seemed to have achieved their intended
objective of restraining tort liability costs. That this objective has been

fostered does not necessarily imply that it is a laudable goal for legal
reform. That judgement must rest on a more fundamental assessment of
the rationale for pain and suffering damages and the principles that
should guide these damages awards.

35. The extent of this long-run effect may, in part, be a statistical artifact reflecting the
extent to which insurance firms have not already internalized the influence of the tort liability
reforms.

HeinOnline -- 1 Mich. L. & Pol'y Rev. 166 1996

19961

Damages in Search of a Sounder Rationale

5. What Direction for Reform?
Limits on pain and suffering and other damages components can
clearly be consequential. These reforms can have a dramatic effect on tort

liability awards and the overall costs of liability both to the insured as
well as to the insurance companies writing the pertinent coverage. To the
extent that tort liability reform is synonymous with lower tort liability
awards, restrictions on damages of various kinds are certainly effective.
Such a simplistic view does not capture the pertinent economic
rationale for damages amounts. If the objective were to minimize tort
liability awards, this could be achieved by abolishing tort liability altogether. One might suggest that it is optimal to at least abolish the component of damages earmarked for pain and suffering compensation to the
extent that this compensation does not have an insurance or compensation
rationale. However, this approach neglects the potential role of pain and
suffering compensation in meeting the other economic needs of plaintiffs,
notably the coverage of legal fees. It also ignores the potential role of
pain and suffering compensation in providing appropriate deterrence
incentives for the injurer, where these deterrence incentives are not
strictly punitive in nature but are simply the required financial costs that
must be imposed on injurers to create efficient incentives for accident
avoidance in this case.
The difficulty from the standpoint of structuring an optimal compensation scheme is that even within the context of theoretical economic
models there is no optimal solution. Inevitably, there must be some
tradeoff between the competing objectives of providing optimal incentives
for deterrence and optimal amounts of compensation. Thus, pain and
suffering awards recognizing these competing influences would be an
increasing amount depending on the extent to which incentives were
needed to be provided to the injurer to avoid such behavior in future
contexts.
It may be the case that many current pain and suffering awards are
currently in the appropriate range in the sense that they are above the
optimal insurance amount and below the optimal deterrence amount.
However, the current rationale for pain and suffering awards typically
stems from the size of the injury in terms of the magnitude of the
financial loss and the character of the injury experience rather than the
character of the behavior of the injurer. To the extent that the intent of
the pain and suffering award is to simply restore welfare of the victim to
the pre-accident level, one might well question whether these awards are
on sound footing. Restoring the individual's utility is not an appropriate
objective of pain and suffering compensation if one were to ask how this
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compensation would be structured by the plaintiff if faced with the
prospect of purchasing an insurance policy to cover these losses in the
event of an injury. There is also substantial misunderstanding in the legal
literature of the implications of economic theory and the role of insurance
in providing compensation after an injury. The main consequence of
injuries that lead to substantial pain and suffering is that there is also an
associated limitation on the ability of the injured to derive additional
well-being from consumption expenditures. Juries should consider not
only how much pain and suffering reduces welfare but also how effective
compensation will be in enhancing welfare. This phenomenon will tend
to reduce the optimal amount of compensation that is pertinent.
A variety of liability reform proposals involve various limits on pain
and suffering damages, but limits of this kind involve inherent inequities.
Victims who suffer the most serious injuries are likely to be most affected
by these limits even though there is no clearcut basis for assuming that
their awards are most unreasonable from the standpoint of an optimal
pain and suffering compensation amount. The imposition of various limits
on pain and suffering schedules serves largely as a form of discipline.
Until we know exactly what we wish to put on these schedules, then they
have no more rational basis than the current jury awards.
There are a variety of different approaches that could be taken to
limit pain and suffering damages awards or to provide some discipline for
juries. One approach is a cap, which would be a simply dollar limit on
the amount of pain and suffering compensation. The difficulty of a cap
is that there would be inequities across injury types, particularly for the
more severe injuries. A variant of a cap would be to impose a pain and
suffering floor so that only in the case of injuries in which the pain and
suffering was of sufficient consequence would there be any compensation.
The floor approach is also consistent with the empirical findings that
small claims tend to be overcompensated and larger loss claims tend to
be undercompensated both by the courts and through out-of-court settle-

ments. A third possibility is to have a pain and suffering scale under
which there would be a fixed pain and suffering compensation amount for
severe injuries, and the amount of pain and suffering award for minor
injuries would be governed by how the severity of the injury differed
according to this scale. Similarly, there could be pain and suffering
schedules in which there were set pain and suffering amounts established
for particular injuries of different type.
The key issue to be resolve for pain and suffering schedules and
scales is that establishing such arbitrary benchmarks does not resolve the
more fundamental issue of how one should initially assess the value of
pain and suffering damages. Is our objective deterrence or insurance?
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Moreover, the use of these mechanisms is not necessarily sound from an
economic standpoint even if an appropriate reference point can be
established. The jury needs to inquire not only how severe the injury was
in terms of the pain and suffering that occurred, but it also must ascertain
the effect of the injury on the individual's marginal utility of income if
insurance is the objective. If additional expenditures will not enhance
individual welfare or will do so very inefficiently, then pain and suffering
awards will be substantially less desirable from an insurance standpoint
than if such expenditures were highly effective in enhancing welfare.
To establish pain and suffering damages awards, juries currently do
not have precise quantitative guidance. They are asked to apply their
"enlightened conscience" to assess a value for pain and suffering compensation. Although juries are often urged to provide "reasonable compensation" for the pain and suffering that has occurred, what compensation is reasonable and the objectives that are to be promoted by this
compensation are not well defined.
What is needed in tort reform legislation is not so much an arbitrary
numerical structure with respect to pain and suffering damages but rather
a more formal articulation of the objectives that are intended to be
promoted through this pain and suffering compensation. The appropriate
levels of pain and suffering awards vary substantially depending on
whether our objective is to make the victim whole, provide optimal
insurance, provide optimal deterrence, or foster some other objective.
Economists do not know the appropriate answers to all of these questions,
but they could begin the process of refining our knowledge of these
issues if there was a well-defined objective. The present situation in
which the rationale for pain and suffering compensation is not wellarticulated in a manner that fosters jury understanding of the appropriate
level of pain and suffering compensation has created an environment of

uncertainty in which juries are widely perceived to be acting capriciously.
The primary source of the difficulty may not be with jurors but rather
with the murky guidance they are being given.36

36. While it is true that such guidance is not generally superimposed for common law,
state tort liability reforms have constrained tort awards in a variety of ways. Similarly, they
could also provide structure with respect to pain and suffering award principles.
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Figure 1
Accidental Effects When Accidents Involve
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Figure 2

Accidental Effects When Accidents Involve
Pecuniary and Nonpecuniary Losses
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Figure 3
Loss Ratio Trends for Michigan
Medical Malpractice Insurance
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